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The Effect of Trade Agendas on Regulatory 
Governance
When the EU Meets the Global South
Andrea C. Bianculli
Abstract
This paper focuses on the significance of regulatory governance at the regional level. In doing so, it analyzes 
to what extent and how North-South negotiations give rise to particular forms of regulatory governance in 
the developing world. To what extent do these forms vary across policy areas? Which elements account for 
the observed differences and similarities? Empirically, the paper explores the negotiation process between 
the European Union (EU) and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), which aims to promote trade 
liberalization on the one hand, and the harmonization of regulatory frameworks on the other. The focus 
is on the trade and cooperative agendas involved in trade facilitation and education. Findings suggest that 
the negotiation of North-South agreements impacts on the ways in which different forms of regulatory 
governance are expressed, but this varies among particular policy issues. Both the type of norm promoted 
and the capacity building mechanisms envisaged create a particular ideational and material context, all 
of which in turn affects the actor constellation – type of actor, specific role and network configuration – 
hence leading to different regulatory governance regimes among policy areas, yet within the same trade 
negotiation.
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1. Introduction1
During the last decades, the world has been going through a process of globalization and transnationaliza-
tion. Far from implying the disappearance of international rules, this process has led to the widening and 
deepening of regulations governing global politics. The rise of regulation entails an increasing fragmenta-
tion of power between state and non-state actors and, at the same time, the creation of new networks and 
alliances (Djelic/Sahlin-Andersson 2006). An inherently uneven process, regulation takes place at different 
institutional levels (Duina 2006).
From a multilateral perspective, the completion of the World Trade Organization (WTO) increased the pres-
sures for harmonizing regulatory frameworks within the domestic arena and had a major impact on the 
institutions of domestic governance (Dymond/Hart 2001; Ostry 1997). However, as the Doha Round faded, 
a large number of countries turned to bilateral and regional trade agreements, including North-South trade 
negotiations which pulled together developed and developing countries (Heydon/Woolcock 2010; Tussie/
Saguier 2011).
These agreements entail new trading rules that increase free trade among countries, but at the same time, 
extend regulatory standards and disciplines to new areas (Dent 2006; Phillips 2007; Roffe/Santa Cruz 2006). 
Thus, apart from the more traditional issues relating to trade liberalization and market opening, in those 
areas where regulatory issues are relevant – namely, intellectual property rights (IPRs), investment, ser-
vices and government procurement – North-South trade negotiations aim to harmonize rules to promote 
common regulatory frameworks.
Both the European Union (EU) and the United States, the world’s major trading partners, have pursued 
North-South trade agreements, including bilateral as well as regional negotiations with Latin America. 
While the literature has analyzed the effects of these broader and deeper agendas in an extensive manner, 
the ways in which the negotiations make an impact on regional regulatory governance regimes remains a 
rather neglected issue. This study addresses the gap and makes an original contribution by proposing an 
exploratory framework to unravel how and to what extent the negotiation of North-South agreements pro-
motes specific forms of regulatory governance at the regional tier in the South. Despite the resurgence of 
regionalisms and intraregional relations since the late 1980s, research concerning regulatory governance 
at the regional level in the developing world is still surprisingly limited. It is only recently that the literature 
on regulation has even acknowledged the particularities of the regulatory state in the South (Dubash/
Morgan 2013; Minogue/Cariño 2006).
Empirically, the paper delves into the negotiation process between the EU and the Southern Common 
Market (Mercosur). The agreement focuses not simply on the expansion of trade, but also addresses the 
1 This working paper results from research conducted at the Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) “The Transformative 
Power of Europe,” hosted at the Freie Universität Berlin (2012-2013) and which is funded by the German Research 
Foundation (DFG). I am grateful to Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse for much thought-provoking feedback on 
earlier versions of this paper. Many thanks also to my colleagues and senior scholars at the KFG for their useful 
comments and suggestions during our Jour Fixe seminars. Finally yet importantly, I would like to thank the KFG 
team for their editorial support.
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obstacles posed by national rules on economic flows by pushing towards the harmonization or creation 
of common regulatory frameworks in a diverse set of policy areas, thus promoting “deep integration” 
(Lawrence 1996). The study hence comparatively assesses this process across two policy sectors: trade 
facilitation and education. Do these agendas promote different forms of regulatory governance? Which 
elements account for the observed differences and similarities? My argument is that the agendas under 
negotiation vary in terms of the norms and the capacity building mechanisms promoted, which in turn 
can shape the prominence of distinct actors and networks, hence leading to particular forms of regulatory 
governance.
To develop the argument the paper first presents the theoretical arguments underlying this research: the 
key transformations in the governance of international trade as the agenda moves beyond negative inte-
gration to promote positive rule making. The third section introduces the exploratory framework, while the 
fourth explores the dynamics between the norms, capacity building mechanisms deployed, and the actor 
constellation across trade facilitation and education. After presenting a comparative assessment in section 
five, the article concludes by drawing out the implications for the characterization of the EU’s role in these 
emerging forms of regulatory governance in the Global South.
2. The New Trade Agenda: From the GATT to the WTO and Beyond
2.1  From Negative to Positive Integration at the Multilateral Level
The nature of the international trade agenda has undergone important transformations during the last 25 
years. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, 1947) began as a negative integration project 
relying on a basic and common framework for reducing tariffs, and thus remained exclusively a negative 
integration process (Fligstein 2005; Scharpf 1996, 1999). Years later, the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, 
which led to the creation of the WTO, signaled the evolution of the multilateral trade agenda from negative 
integration to positive rule making (Dymond/Hart 2001). As a positive integration project, the multilateral 
trade agenda aims at “the reconstruction of a system of economic regulation at the level of the larger eco-
nomic unit” (Scharpf 1999: 45), which will guide trade across national boundaries through rules specifying 
how exchanges will be governed (Fligstein 2005).
Even if demands for further liberalization have not been exhausted – as shown by negotiations in agricul-
ture, textiles, automobiles and the banking and insurance sectors (De Bièvre 2006) – the completion of the 
WTO marked a turn towards the negotiation of international regulatory agreements in issues falling within 
domestic regulations and reaching deeply into domestic governance mechanisms (Dymond/Hart 2001).2 
Furthermore, under the WTO, countries negotiate and exchange access to their markets for regulation. 
This has created incentives to defend domestic regulations at the international level and industrialized 
countries have demanded that trade agreements be supplemented with regulation in diverse public policy 
domains, including IPRs, competition policy, investments and services (education and health). This affects 
the governance of trade.
2 For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the trade regime after the creation of the WTO, see Ostry (1997).
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Whereas negative integration policies relate to an approach based on liberalization and deregulation and 
only require governments to abstain from interfering with market forces, positive integration policies in-
creasingly rely on regulations that require states to intervene and take certain measures (Scharpf 1999; 
Wallace 2005). Consequently, whereas it might be relatively easy for governments to produce negative 
measures, thus increasing market integration by eliminating national restraints on trade and distortions of 
competition, agreeing on positive integration rules, which shape the conditions under which markets op-
erate, turns out to be a more complicated task. Agreement on positive rules of market integration remains 
extremely difficult and in many cases almost impossible because of relevant differences among countries 
in terms of normative or ideological positions, levels of economic development and institutional and policy 
patterns (Scharpf 1999). Additionally, strengthening the trade agenda falls within the universe of domestic 
regulations and reaches deeply into domestic governance, which affects the incentives for a diverse set of 
societal actors. In turn, this means that positive regulations require states to call for “consensus among a 
wide range of divergent national and group interests” (Scharpf 1999: 71). 
2.2  Positive Integration at the Interregional Level
This “new deep trade agenda” (Young/Peterson 2006), “postmodern agenda” (Dymond/Hart 2001) or 
“regulatory trade agenda” (De Bièvre 2006; Woll/Artigas 2007) has a correlate in bilateral and interregional 
trade negotiations. The failure of the Cancun Ministerial Meeting in 2003 and the subsequent deadlock in 
the Doha Round led to a dramatic rise in the number of separate North-South trade agreements (Heydon/
Woolcock 2010; Tussie/Saguier 2011).
Positive integration among states is difficult to achieve. The multilateral agenda and the working of the 
WTO add to the complexity. They bring together countries with important differences in terms of their 
levels of economic, political and institutional development, and which have hence different preferences 
regarding positive integration regulations. Still, most of the divisive issues of the multilateral trade agenda, 
which face opposition from developing countries, are now part of North-South trade negotiations. Thus, 
apart from the more traditional issues related to trade liberalization and market opening, North-South 
negotiations aim to harmonize domestic rules and regulations to promote common regulatory frameworks. 
Though a feature of both South-South and North-South regional trade negotiations, progress towards 
regulatory harmonization has turned out to be more intense in the case of the latter, especially in the 
bilateral trade agreements signed since the early 2000s (Roffe/Santa Cruz 2006). These initiatives have 
placed stronger emphasis on the imposition of market discipline than on trade liberalization itself (Dent 
2006; Phillips 2007).
Whereas the rise of the new trade politics has not been unique to the EU, the European bloc has been 
the most vocal advocate of strengthening trade agendas. As it sought further regulatory agreements at 
the WTO (Baldwin 2006), its multilateral trade strategy linked market access with regulatory issues in the 
areas of competition policy, environmental standards, labor rights and investment rules (Deutsch 2001).3 
3 This change in EU trade policy is explored in Young/Peterson (2006) and Young (2007).
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However, as the Doha Development Round faded, the EU abandoned its demands for the negotiation of 
positive integration rules - namely, competition policy, government procurement, investment and trade 
facilitation – at the multilateral level, and turned to other negotiation scenarios, where its leverage was 
greater and opposition less pronounced. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), ‘plus’, and bi- and 
pluri-lateral agreements, including Association Agreements, appeared as relevant spaces for further 
promoting these regulatory agendas (EC 2004; Young/Peterson 2006).
With a focus on Latin America, the literature has analyzed the impact of these broader and deeper agendas 
in an extensive manner.4 However, to my knowledge studies have not focused on the particular ways 
in which the negotiation of different agendas gives rise to particular forms of regulatory governance in 
the developing world. To what extent do these forms of regulatory governance vary across policy areas? 
Which elements account for the differences and/or similarities? Based on a “policy creates politics” (Lowi 
1964) argument, this study explores the factors facilitating or constraining particular forms of regulatory 
governance in diverse policy areas at the regional tier of governance.
3.  Interregional Trade Negotiations and Regulatory Governance Regimes
From a regional perspective, the expansion and diffusion of regulation across the EU has been studied 
extensively both in terms of how the regional organization affects domestic policies, institutions and po-
litical processes of member states and accession candidates (Börzel/Risse 2007; Bruszt/McDermott 2011; 
Featherstone/Radaelli 2003; Treib 2008). Though still scarce, analyses have recently acknowledged the 
emergence of new patterns of regulatory governance in the Global South, which certainly differ from the 
EU in terms of policy areas and regulatory mechanisms established. From an Asian perspective, but also 
with a focus on Latin America, studies have shown that though still rudimentary, especially when com-
pared with the already institutionalized and supranational regulatory governance mechanisms in the EU, 
new types of regulatory governance are taking shape in the South (Jayasuriya 2008).
Building on this, the paper attempts to disentangle to what extent North-South trade negotiations contrib-
ute to these emerging forms of regulatory governance in the South. This is especially relevant in the case 
of Latin America, where regional integration has remained, until recently, “asymmetric” (Holman 2004): 
Countries have largely pursued integration through “negative regulation,” but this has not been matched 
by “positive regulation.” Furthermore, North-South negotiations involve rule makers and rule takers: be-
cause of the limited capacity of rule takers – namely, developing countries – they are expected to comply 
with the rules and standards set by the former (Bruszt/McDermott 2011; Streeck/Thelen 2005).
Given that North-South agendas place increasing emphasis on positive integration policies aimed at promot-
ing coordination and harmonization in different regulatory areas, I argue that these negotiation processes 
give rise to particular forms of regulatory governance at the regional level. The paper aims to reconstruct 
“the strategic constellations as they are defined by the institutional setting within which interactions take 
4 For a review of this literature, see Bianculli (2010).
The Effect of Trade Agendas on Regulatory Governance  | 9
place” (Scharpf 1999: 70). The underlying assumption is that different trade agendas elicit particular policy 
dynamics underpinned by strategic constellations of state and non-state actors, whose nature, roles and 
network configurations will be determined by the institutional setting of the negotiation process, namely 
the specific norms and capacity building mechanisms devised.
3.1  The Negotiation of Regulatory Commitments Across Agendas
Whereas the precise definition of the relation between regulation and trade can sometimes be blurred 
(Woll/Artigas 2007), I understand regulation as mechanisms of social and economic control (Baldwin et al. 
1998), and as encompassing formal and informal rules promoted by constellations of multiple (state and 
non-state) actors across different levels: national, regional and interregional. Regulation hence proceeds 
not only by means of legal sanctions and coercive powers but also through softer mechanisms. Indeed, the 
creation and embedding of social norms, shared standards and voluntary schemes by states, corporations 
and civil society actors may well be more effective. Moreover, regulation guides and controls activities and 
interactions within, beyond, and across national borders.
Regulation works differently in economic and social policy sectors as these stand for different represen-
tations of risk and hence entail diverse patterns of cooperation and conflict. Economic regulation deals 
with the functioning of market competition and includes various tools to establish, manage and supervise 
markets, while social regulation is concerned with non-economic issues and intends to address market 
failures and eliminate or reduce risks or exposure to risks (Levi-Faur 2011: 13; Meier 1985). Furthermore, 
and in terms of market integration, measures of negative policies may be classified as being market making, 
whereas positive regulatory policies may be either market making, as in the case of the elimination of 
non-tariff barriers to trade, or market correcting, as for example, process-oriented regulations of working 
conditions or pollution control (Scharpf 1999). Hence, when analyzing the relation between trade nego-
tiations and regulation, the picture gains in complexity because of the move from at-the-border towards 
behind-the-border measures, on the one hand, and the simultaneous negotiation of regulatory commit-
ments aimed at both regulating the creation of markets – economic regulation – and addressing market 
failures – social regulation – on the other.
Building on these two different dimensions – the place where trade barriers are situated and the primary 
focus of the regulatory commitments – Young (2007) develops a typology of policy issues addressed in 
multilateral trade negotiations as depicted in the following table.
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Table 1. Typology of regulatory commitments in trade negotiations
 At-the-border Behind-the-border 
   
Competition Traditional trade policy 
- Agriculture (export subsidies, 
levies) 
- Quantitative restrictions 
- Tariffs 
Commercial policy 
- Agriculture (subsidies) 
- Competition policy 
- Government procurement 
- Intellectual property rights 
- Investment 
- Subsidies 
- Trade facilitation 
- Trade-related investment 
measures 
Market failure (discriminatory import bans) Social trade policy 
- Agriculture (multifunctionality) 
- Environment 
- Labor standards 
- Services 
- Technical barriers to trade 
 Source: Own construction, based on Young (2007).
Whereas traditional trade policy encompasses those commitments aimed at addressing at-the-border 
barriers in an attempt to regulate competition from foreign firms, commercial trade policy also addresses 
competition, though regulatory commitments reach within the domestic market as in the case of subsidies 
and of most of the Singapore issues: investment, competition policy, government procurement and trade 
facilitation. Finally, social trade policy stands at the intersection of behind-the-border measures and it 
focuses on market failures by addressing the negative externalities of pollution, for example, or by the 
attempt to export and promote regulatory standards in labor and environment. Even if it builds on Young’s 
categorization, my own table departs in two important ways. First, trade facilitation is included under com-
mercial trade policy, given its characterization as one of the Singapore issues. Trade facilitation has broad-
ened in recent years “to include the environment in which trade transactions take place, including the 
transparency and professionalism of customs and regulatory environments, as well as harmonization of 
standards and conformance to international or regional regulations” (Wilson et al. 2005: 842). Thus, trade 
facilitation measures move inside or behind the border of domestic policies and governance structures. 
Second, services are included within the third category – social trade policy – on the basis that regulatory 
commitments in this area, especially in education and health, are sensitive issues directly affecting the role 
of the state in the provision of public services. These might hence find high resistance because of ideologi-
cal and normative differences among states, but also due to their different level of economic development 
and institutional arrangements (Scharpf 1999).
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3.2 Regulatory Governance Regimes: The Institutional Setting and Strategic   
 Constellations
When analyzing the nuances of trade politics, studies have acknowledged variation across agendas accord-
ing to the level of political salience and certainty over distributional effects (Poletti 2012), as well as the 
uncertainty of political outcomes and the technical requirements attached to the negotiation of South-
South, North-South and WTO trade agendas, as having differential impacts on domestic trade governance 
(Bianculli 2010). Furthermore, different types of issues or regulatory commitments are expected to elicit 
particular political dynamics: given the relevant variance in terms of the distribution of anticipated costs 
and benefits, they have a different impact on the incentive structure, and hence mobilization patterns of 
different actors (Lowi 1964; Wilson 1980). The negotiation of regulatory commitments under the three dif-
ferent policy types depicted in Table 1 are also expected to trigger different policy dynamics (Young 2007).
Despite the particular focus of these various models, they have all highlighted the governance processes as 
varying dramatically because they depend on the particular constellations that evolve within particular pol-
icy domains or issues, showing the increasing complexities and nuances of trade politics today. By propos-
ing an exploratory framework based on the institutional setting promoted by the negotiation of particular 
regulatory commitments, this study attempts to unravel the ways and extent to which the negotiation of 
regulatory commitments across agendas gives rise to particular forms of regulatory governance regimes at 
the regional level. The institutional setting is defined by the content of the agenda and the capacity building 
mechanisms deployed. Whereas the content of the agendas refers to the emphasis placed on particular 
policy issues and the nature of the ideas and norms promoted, capacity building mechanisms include the 
modes of assistance. 
First, and in terms of the norms promoted, they can vary between regional and international norms, and 
between external-regional norms, as when the norms promoted by another regional bloc prevail over 
locally inspired norms, namely, domestic-regional ones.5 Second, the modes of assistance or capacity build-
ing measures refer to the type and amount of resources provided; the particular actors targeted and the 
cooperative requirements.
Resources can be financial, informational or organizational.6 While the specific type of assistance and the 
amount of resources deployed are relevant, the second dimension – the type and number of actors ad-
dressed by these different mechanisms – is, in fact, a more relevant factor when depicting the institutional 
setting. These mechanisms can range from those having an exclusive focus on state actors, privileging 
them over non-state actors, to more inclusive patterns addressing both state and non-state actors. The 
latter, however, does not exclude the fact that particular civil society actors might be privileged over others. 
Disentangling how the capacity building strategies work in terms of actors addressed is crucial, given that 
to the extent they address a variety of relevant state and non-state actors they provide incentives and a 
5 I would like to thank Tanja Börzel for bringing this distinction among regional norms to my attention.
6 When analyzing the ways in which transnational integration regimes (TIRs) shape the development of regulatory 
institutions in emerging market democracies, Bruszt/McDermott (2011) look into the amount and type of re-
sources the TIR offers them. These are mainly of three types: financial, informational and organizational.
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variety of resources, all of which are expected to improve regulatory governance. Finally, the cooperative 
requirements refers to the extent to which these capacity building mechanisms require cooperation at the 
regional or international levels. The following table summarizes the independent variable, its different 
dimensions and expected variation.
Table 2. Institutional setting: Two dimensions and their variations
Source: Own construction.
In turn, the various combinations observed across the independent variable, the dimensions and variations 
within each are expected to lead to different forms of regulatory governance. These forms are defined by 
the strategic constellations of actors involved – namely, state and non-state actors, including businesses, 
labor, CSOs, academia and professionals – and their role, together with their relations and network config-
urations.7 The following table summarizes the expected variation in the dependent variable.
Table 3: Strategic constellations
  Actors 
  Mono-stakeholder Multi-stakeholders 
Network 
configuration 
Regional Dyadic Regional Constellation Multiplex Regional Constellation 
International Dyadic International Constellation 
Multiplex International 
Constellation 
 Source: Own construction.
Hence, my main argument is that the different combinations of norms and capacity building mechanisms 
deployed within the negotiation agenda will result in particular strategic constellations. In turn, these are 
expected to lead to different forms of regulatory governance. Building on the literature on regimes (Krasner 
1982; Ruggie 1982), I understand regulatory governance regimes as regulatory spaces encompassing the 
rules, norms and institutional procedures about which actors’ expectations converge in a given policy area. 
The notion moves beyond states, and includes non-state actors and their networks.
7 Jayasuriya (2008; 2009) argues that deepening our understanding of these emerging forms of regulatory gov-
ernance implies looking into the nature of actors and their networks, together with their relations with other 
national and regional actors and organizations.
Norms
•	 Regional vs. international
•	 External-regional vs. domestic-regional
Capacity building 
mechanisms
•	 Type and amount of resources:
- Financial, informational, organizational
•	 Type and number of actors addressed:
- State and non-state actors (business, labor, civil society organizations 
(CSOs), academia and professionals)
•	 Cooperative requirements:
- Regional or international levels
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The study applies this exploratory framework to the empirical analysis of the negotiation process between 
the EU and Mercosur, to see whether and how inter-regional negotiations promote the emergence of par-
ticular regulatory governance regimes, and to what extent these vary across policy areas. The cross-policy 
comparative assessment is based on two different policy issues: trade facilitation and education. Both ser-
vices liberalization in education and trade facilitation entail positive and negative integration policies. On 
the one hand, negotiating trade facilitation and the liberalization of educational services entails shallow or 
negative integration policies – namely, the removal of border barriers to trade or agreements on rules that 
should be prevented – to allow market creation. Still, these issues also entail deep or positive integration 
policies “that facilitate trade by reducing or eliminating regulatory and behind-the-border impediments to 
trade, where those impediments may or may not be intentional” (Evans et al. 2007: 3). These refer, in the 
case of trade facilitation for example, to the agreement on standards of procedure and monitor agency 
conduct (Chauffour/Maur 2010), the regulation of domestic services production that discriminate against 
foreigners, or the harmonization of accreditation processes to allow for the circulation of teachers and 
students, as in the case of education. In all, the negotiation of these agendas goes beyond the adoption 
of policies to open markets, and requires the harmonization and coordination of norms and standards, or 
mutual recognition of each other’s regulatory processes and standards. Consequently, they reach deep 
into domestic governance arrangements. Still, while education is conceived as a public good, and trade 
liberalization in this area challenges traditional regulatory and institutional governance frameworks guid-
ing the provision of education, trade facilitation is catalogued as the more technical area. While they are 
“fundamental services for the effective implementation of a series of social rights” (Verger 2008: 19), trade 
liberalization in education may introduce limitations on state regulation, expand private sector education 
and even affect educational quality. Hence, my expectation is that the negotiation of regulatory commit-
ments in these two different policy areas will lead to different regulatory governance regimes within the 
interregional negotiation process.
The narrative builds on the analysis of secondary literature and relevant written documents, including 
the Regional Strategy Papers (RSP) in which the European Commission (EC) identifies the objective and 
guidelines for EU policy towards Mercosur, with a focus on the 2000s. These regional strategies are com-
plemented by the Regional Indicative Programmes (RIP) describing the specific sector measures, periods 
and planned financial engagement and expenses, which identify particular areas as “focal sectors,” namely, 
regional institutionalization, deepening of the Mercosur market and implementation of the future EU-
Mercosur association agreement, and strengthening civil society participation, together with institutional 
websites and secondary literature.
4. EU and Mercosur Interregional Negotiations: A Cross-Policy Analysis of   
 Regulatory Governance Regimes
Building on these insights, this paper analyzes the institutional conditions under which the negotiation pro-
cess between the EU and Mercosur gives rise to particular forms of regulatory governance in the Southern 
bloc. The EU-Mercosur relationship is based on the Interregional Framework for Cooperation Agreement 
(EMFICA) signed in 1995 to promote an Interregional Association Agreement founded on three pillars: 
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trade liberalization, strengthened forms of political dialogue, and cooperation.8 After long years of intense 
and legally driven relations across the Atlantic, trade negotiations were launched in 1999. Almost 15 years 
later and after nine negotiation rounds (the last one in October 2012), concluding a final agreement still 
seems elusive. In 2004, the situation had already reached a standstill, which lasted until the re-launch of 
negotiations at the EU-Latin America and the Caribbean (EU-LAC) Summit (Madrid, May 2010). However, 
the suspension of trade negotiations did not bring a loss of EU interest in the region. Relations continued 
through ministerial and informal technical meetings intended to deepen the agenda on political dialogue 
and cooperation (Botto/Bianculli 2011). Hence, even if trade negotiations followed a stop and go pattern, 
the EU relied on a fundamental instrument to facilitate and thus maintain the process: financial coopera-
tion and technical assistance as depicted in the various RSP.
The interregional process envisages a comprehensive trade agreement, currently under negotiation, which 
covers not only trade in industrial and agricultural goods, but also services, improvement of rules on gov-
ernment procurement, IPRs, customs and trade facilitation, and technical barriers to trade. Clearly, this 
reflects the EU’s “new trade and development agenda” and its growing emphasis on regulatory issues, ca-
pacity building and aid for trade (Faber/Orbie 2008). Within this context, the agreement with Chile (2002) 
was already portrayed in the early 2000s as the most comprehensive example of the EU’s trade policy 
towards the South and as the bloc’s “ideal framework” for its bilateral trade relations (Lamy 2002b).9 The 
negotiation process with Mercosur was intended to follow similar steps: “the negotiations will cover the 
whole range of sectors, because Europe will come with its own interests, such as industry, services, public 
procurement, and intellectual property” (Lamy 2000: 7). Furthermore, the bilateral arena would explore 
“complementary negotiation methods to bring more ambitious results” (Mandelson 2005: 5).
Even if the negotiation has not led to the signing of a single and comprehensive agreement containing clear 
commitments, these long years of negotiations have provided an institutional setting in which interactions 
occur, promoting communication, socialization, and persuasion. Participation in trade negotiations thus 
promotes a learning-by-doing process (Bianculli 2010). This process opens a space where different state 
and non-state actors, operating at the national and (inter) regional levels, promote, negotiate and contest 
not only trade liberalization rules but also regulatory frameworks reaching into social and political domains. 
Furthermore, it provides financial, informational and organizational resources to specific state and non-
state actors in an attempt to promote capacity building (Börzel et al. 2008). Portrayed as “an enabling 
instrument”, capacity building can allow states and non-state actors to accept and adopt specific policy 
ideas and institutions. Thus understood, capacity building can complement other diffusion mechanisms 
(Börzel/Risse 2009: 7).10
8 The Framework was the next step from the 1992 Inter-Institutional Cooperation Agreement, the Joint Declaration 
of 22 December 1994, which already established the institutionalization of political dialogue and economic negoti-
ations as the two pillars of the relationship, and the Declaration on Political Dialogue of 15 September 1995.
9 Pascal Lamy – EU Trade Commissioner (1999-2004) – portrayed this agreement as “the most ambitious and innova-
tive results ever for a bilateral agreement by the EU” and as being “a ’fourth generation plus’ agreement as it covers 
all the areas of our trade relation going well beyond our respective WTO commitments” (Lamy 2002b: 2).
10 The literature has identified four main mechanisms as driving diffusion processes: coercion, competition, learning 
and emulation, see Gilardi (2012); Marsh/Sharman (2009). More recently, Börzel and Risse (2012) have provided 
a more nuanced categorization of the mechanisms underlying the diffusion of ideas, policies and institutions 
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Building on these insights, the paper delineates how certain combinations of norms and capacity building 
mechanisms devised within trade negotiations promote or restrain specific strategic constellations shap-
ing, in turn, the particular regulatory governance regimes at Mercosur level.
4.1 The Trade and Cooperative Agendas: Norms and Capacity Building Mechanisms
4.1.1  Trade Facilitation
The 2002-2006 RSP links cooperation to support for the negotiation process and highlights the creation of 
the Mercosur common market. In fact, and given the early stage of both Mercosur’s customs union and 
common market, which suffered from relevant internal barriers, interregional cooperation was to deepen 
the institutionalization and enforcement of common rules and standards, while removing non-tariff bar-
riers impeding trade among Mercosur partners, as in the case of customs duties. The elimination of non-
trade barriers was fundamental to deepening the integration process and facilitating trade among member 
countries. In turn, the implementation of facilitation measures upholding interdependence between the 
two regions was a prerequisite for the conclusion of the negotiation process and the future sustainability 
of the association agreement.
Organized into three main areas, cooperation in trade facilitation was then incorporated under the priority 
“Institutionalization of Mercosur”, whose final objective was “the possible creation of Mercosur regulatory 
bodies” (EC 2002a: 29-30). In terms of the capacity building mechanisms envisaged, these include both 
financial and informational assistance. In financial terms, 26 per cent of the total funding was devoted to in-
stitutional efforts at making Mercosur’s institutions stronger, including those promoting trade facilitation.11 
To this end, the document anticipated the implementation of the trade facilitation measures depicted in 
the “Action Plan” agreed at the Madrid Summit in 2002. Capacity building also included informational 
mechanisms through European Technical Assistance, aimed at training officials in Mercosur institutions 
through workshops, courses, working groups and studies.
This trend has continued in the RSP for the period 2007-2013, which identifies three main challenges: 
support of regional integration, preparation of the implementation of the future trade chapter of the as-
sociation agreement, and trade-related assistance. With a focus on trade policy and regulation, regional 
trade related assistance in the area of trade facilitation envisages informational and organizational mech-
anisms through capacity building and the improvement of trade and customs procedures. Interestingly, 
by differentiating between direct and indirect mechanisms. Focused on the diffusion process as initiated by the 
sender, direct mechanisms include coercion, manipulation of utility calculation, socialization and persuasion. 
Indirect mechanisms, on the contrary, look into the diffusion process from the recipient’s perspective and involve 
competition, the drawing of lessons and normative emulation. Capacity building can then work as complementary 
to any of these mechanisms.
11 The other two areas of the cooperative strategy referred to the internal market and were intended to make the 
bloc’s economic and trade structures more dynamic and integrated (44 per cent of total funding) and to support 
civil society (30 per cent of total funding).
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this document now specifies the content and in particular the type of regulatory norms to be promoted: 
it highlights the acceptance of international standards, namely, the World Customs Organization (WCO) 
Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade.12
The objectives of trade related-assistance mechanisms will be dealt with at the regional level and in ac-
cordance with Mercosur’s own integration chart. According to previous EU experiences and shortcomings, 
cooperation will rely on a clear and strategic action plan based on Mercosur’s own integration work pro-
gram, rather than on a list of projects. Particular features and requirements of each individual country 
will be taken into account. Thus, the Country Strategy Paper (CSP) of Mercosur member states includes a 
regional dimension, too. They incorporate the specific list of actions each of the four countries will carry 
out, whereas the follow-up and monitoring remains at the responsibility of a Mercosur institution – though 
one not specified in the document. 
The high level of financial assistance reflects the priority given to Mercosur’s efforts for the completion 
of the common market, which receives 70 per cent of the € 50 million allocated to Mercosur. Moreover, 
part of the money allocated for the 2002-2006 period that had not been spent was re-directed towards 
further trade related technical assistance, especially on customs and sanitary and phytosanitary standards 
(EC 2007). Informational assistance is also relevant as both parties emphasize the importance of technical 
cooperation to promote trade facilitation, as in the case of the Mercosur-EU Customs Cooperation Project 
(PADUEM), whose second phase was from 2004 to 2007. Led by the private sector, PADUEM was to provide 
an adequate response to regulatory harmonization as required by the customs union. It included norms 
related to customs procedures, simplification and harmonization, information technology support, correct 
application of the common customs tariff, adoption of an agreement for mutual backing between Mercosur 
member states, modernization of human resources management, and customs training.13 Emphasis was 
put on the use of European Technical Assistance, despite the “plenty of qualified local experts available” 
(Rom Support Team 2006: 14).
Trade facilitation was also included in the agenda of the EU-Mercosur Bi-regional Negotiations Committee 
(BNC) (Peña 2008), the main negotiating body between the EU and Mercosur, including Council mem-
bers, members of the EC’s General Directorates for Trade and Foreign Affairs, and the foreign ministers 
of Mercosur countries (Botto/Bianculli 2011). With the relaunch of trade negotiations in 2010, the issue 
of trade facilitation gained space in the agenda of the BNC. During the seventeenth meeting of the BNC 
(Buenos Aires, 2010), negotiators identified trade facilitation as one of the most important requirements 
achieved by 2004.
12 WCO was created in 1947 when the thirteen European governments represented in the Committee for European 
Economic Co-operation agreed to set up a Study Group to examine the possibility of establishing one or more in-
ter-European Customs Unions based on the principles of the GATT. One year later, the Study Group set up two com-
mittees: an Economic Committee, predecessor of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), and a Customs Committee, which became the Customs Co-operation Council (CCC). In 1994, as the CCC 
became a global intergovernmental institution bringing together 177 customs administrations, its name changed 
to the World Customs Organization. For further details, see http://www.wcoomd.org/en.aspx, last accessed 27 
March 2013.
13 For further details, see http://www.arcaconsortium.net/ESP/mer01.aspx, last accessed 28 March 2013.
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Despite the limited public information available regarding the records of these meetings, progress seems 
to have been made in the area of customs (trade facilitation) and related matters since parties clarified 
positions and exchanged proposals on customs and trade facilitation in October 2012 (BNC 2012). However, 
the more concrete institutional recommendations – especially, the establishment of an EU-Mercosur 
Joint Customs Cooperation Committee, already established in the Buenos Aires Statement on Business 
Facilitation – are still lagging behind.14
4.1.2  Education
Education is also part of the free trade agenda between the EU and Mercosur, under trade liberalization 
in services, including commitments in the area of higher education15 and a whole range of knowledge 
intensive services (ÖFSE et al. 2009). As such, educational matters are negotiated within the BNC. Still, 
liberalization of educational services has not been a relevant issue in the inter-regional negotiation process 
and has mainly advanced through the cooperative agenda (Botto/Peixoto Batista 2008). In fact, under 
the trade agenda, liberalization in the education sector has worked as a “bargaining chip” for the nego-
tiation of other issues in which Mercosur countries have opposing interests, as in the case of agriculture. 
Interregional negotiations about this obliged Mercosur members to agree on a common position towards 
trade liberalization in services, including in education, leading in turn to the signing of the Protocol of 
Montevideo on Trade in Services in 1997. This should bring about a complete reduction of intra-regional 
discrimination by 2015. 
EU cooperation with education in Mercosur as detailed in the 2002-2006 RSP focuses on the support of civil 
society through various strategies. Based on the important role assigned to civil society, namely, academics, 
social and economic partners, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), financial, informational and 
organizational mechanisms are part of the whole capacity building strategy. Apart from the financial assis-
tance mechanisms deployed through projects related to the provision of information about negotiations 
and their impact on both regions, cooperation in the field of education is set to contribute to legislative har-
monization and the development of common policies in Mercosur, while also supporting educational pro-
grams in vulnerable sectors. Capacity building mechanisms also include informational resources through 
European technical assistance in those areas where EU proficiency is relevant: advice on policy and legisla-
tive measures, training, workshops, dialogue and exchanges of expertise amongst relevant agents in both 
regions, together with the development of specific Mercosur measures.
These objectives are still valid under the 2007-2013 RSP, which promotes both informational and organi-
zational mechanisms through the strengthening and enhancing of civil society participation, knowledge of 
the regional integration process, mutual understanding and mutual visibility as the third priority. To this 
14 The document states that only six articles are currently without brackets, one of these being “the article on Special 
Committee on Customs, Trade Facilitation and Rules of Origin” (BNC 2012: 6).
15 Education is one of the twelve service sectors covered under the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). Within education, trade liberalization is promoted in the following subsectors: primary education; second-
ary education; higher education; adult education; and other educational services.
18 | KFG Working Paper No. 57 | November 2013 
end, cooperation focuses on the creation of EU-Mercosur study centers,16 the organization of workshops 
and seminars to promote the interchange of expertise and assistance, together with support of the “Plan of 
the Mercosur Educational Sector 2006-2010.” Twenty per cent of the €50 million allocated for the period is 
directed toward this, while €10 million is allocated to two projects in the area of education and information 
that were not finalized under the previous RSP. Projects and programs financed under the CSP and various 
Latin American regional programs complement these resources. This cooperative strategy relies heavily 
on Mercosur’s new integration agenda, which includes, among other issues, the mutual recognition of 
diplomas. Only in 2011 did EU cooperation in education reach higher levels by contributing to two projects 
in this area.
First, the 2007 Annual Action Plan introduces the “Higher Education Mobility Support Program” (€3 mil-
lion), which is based on the idea that intra-regional relations demand new steps in the integration process 
by elaborating regional policies in areas such as education, social cohesion and environment. The objec-
tive is to support the consolidation and expansion of Mercosur’s own mobility program for undergradu-
ates. In turn, this should contribute to establishing Mercosur citizenship and a sense of regional belonging 
among university students in the four member countries. Second, the “Support Program for the Mercosur 
Educational Sector” (PASEM) (€6,8 million), which was part of previous EU cooperative strategies, had to 
be reformulated and refocused on improving teacher instruction after the European Parliament refused 
to endorse it because it did not contribute to reducing poverty and hence could not be classified as devel-
opment assistance. Co-financed by the EU and Mercosur, PASEM builds on informational assistance: apart 
from promoting initial and continuous teacher training, it focuses on policy design and management to 
enhance educational quality in the region, thus contributing to social cohesion and integration. Teacher 
training institutes in the region are the direct beneficiaries, and implementation relies on the national 
education ministries in each country.
Although the specific norms to be promoted are not explicitly acknowledged in the corresponding docu-
ments, in the area of education, the EU cooperative agenda aims to generate common regulatory criteria 
for accreditation and the recognition of certificates. While this is expected to facilitate the mobility of 
students and highly-skilled workers between the two regions (Bugarín Olvera 2009), the strategy heavily 
relies, in more practical terms, on Mercosur’s own regional process of regulatory harmonization in the area 
of education.
 
16 Building on the new Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Parliament called on the Commision to 
withdraw the initiative for creating these study centers, in particular the initiative to create European/Mercosur 
documentation centers, to establish EU and Mercosur Study Chairs, and to establish Masters’ degrees in EU and 
Mercosur Studies, as this would only widen the gap between rich and poor, EP (2007).
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4.2 The Strategic Constellations: The Actors, Their Roles and Their Networks
4.2.1  Trade Facilitation
Through EU cooperation in trade facilitation, business actors supporting the agreement and relying on tech-
nical expertise in this area were granted direct access to the policymaking process. Thus, the Mercosur-EU 
Business Forum (MEBF) became involved in supporting trade facilitation. Created in November 1997, be-
fore the official launch of interregional trade negotiations and at the prompting of the German Federation 
of Industries, the MEBF was largely inspired by the experience of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue.17 It 
aspired to offer an institutional framework for contributing to the consolidation of trade and inter-business 
relations. Even if trade facilitation was initially not on its agenda, a special group was established to deal 
with it. This was a rather “pragmatic” decision: “as interregional negotiations are not advancing, trade 
facilitation appears as an area where we can contribute positively to the interregional relation (…) and 
supposedly it benefits both parties.”18
Already in 2001, the MEBF presented a very complete and ambitious set of actions to assist Mercosur-EU 
business on the basis that trade facilitation measures should address both restrictions to intra-Mercosur 
and inter-regional trade flows. These focused on three main areas: customs and customs procedures; 
standards, technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures; and electronic commerce (MEBF 
2001). The Buenos Aires Statement on Business Facilitation “pursued a stepwise approach and formulated 
altogether 30 recommendations for short-, medium- and long-term actions” (MEBF 2003: 12), which were 
to be implemented by governments though some of these “were supposed to be implemented by the 
business sector itself” (Peña 2008: 93). This document was the result of the close collaboration between 
the business and technical sectors, as in the case of Siemens and the Argentine Institute of Standardization 
and Certification (IRAM, Instituto Argentino de Normalización y Certificación).19
Most of MEBF’s recommendations found their way into the Business Facilitation Action Plan negotiated 
in 2002 and aimed at promoting Mercosur economic integration in the area of customs (EC 2002b; Lamy 
2002a). Furthermore, trade facilitation was also part of the EU’s financial and technical assistance, and 
clearly aimed at backing up business objectives. As argued by the then Commissioner for External Relations, 
Chris Patten, EU cooperation policy instruments would encourage MEBF priorities (Patten 2002). Later on, 
the MEBF welcomed the cooperative initiatives decided in 2004, as these contributed to the integration 
of customs legislation within Mercosur, together with the training of personnel, improvement of comput-
erized customs formalities, administrative co-operation and the fight against fraud.20 In 2006, the MEBF 
Plenary reiterates the economic importance of trade facilitation and proposes a short list of priorities.
17 The Transatlantic Business Dialogue provides for enhanced cooperation between the governments and business 
communities of the EU and the United States. For further details on the MEBF and its role within the interregional 
negotiations, see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/listening-stakeholders/round-tables/#h2- 
6, last accessed 12 July 2013. The MEBF had its own internet site until 2008, but this is no longer active.
18 Interview with MEBF executive, Buenos Aires, 21 November 2007
19 Interview with IRAM executive, Buenos Aires, 23 November 2007.
20 Interview with MEBF executive, Buenos Aires, 21 November 2007.
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Apart from its access to the negotiation process and the design and implementation of EU cooperation 
in trade facilitation, the MEBF managed to develop strong liaisons with other regional and extra-regional 
institutions. It developed close relations with the academic sector through Sciences Po as it commissioned 
the Chaire Mercosur at this university, a research project on fundamental issues affecting negotiations be-
tween the EU and Mercosur.21 Funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), as well as by compa-
nies and organizations in Argentina, Brazil and the EU, the project aimed at producing new ideas that would 
serve as the basis for developing common positions among the EU and Mercosur business communities 
and an action plan to deepen and strengthen inter-regional economic relations. In all, the objective was to 
elaborate a shared stance for influencing governmental agendas. One of the four issues under examination 
was “the crucial issue of Business and Trade Facilitation.”22 The main conclusions and insights were then 
discussed in two workshops in Buenos Aires and São Paulo (September 2007), the results of which served 
as references for the debates of the MEBF’s VII Plenary Conference (Lisbon, October 2007). One of the 
conclusions reached was that “the business facilitation measures analyzed can be implemented outside 
the scope of the Association Agreement” (MEBF 2007: 4). 
Whereas in terms of results, Lisbon failed to produce as substantive outputs as those derived from the 
Buenos Aires Declaration, for the first time the two main European bodies for Standardization were part 
of the meeting. These refer to the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) and the European 
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC), which constitute the joint European Standards 
Institution, together with the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). Thus, the MEBF at-
tempted further negotiations within the private sector, even if from a state perspective negotiations were 
already held back. However, the underlying goal was no longer the harmonization of norms between the 
EU and Mercosur, but rather the exchange of information and expertise among regulatory bodies, while 
also allowing experts and technical staff to attend meetings.23
Despite existing discrepancies in the trade preferences of both blocs, Mercosur state actors perceived 
capacity building strategies in the areas of customs and trade facilitation as promoting more flow between 
national coordinators involved in projects, this being especially marked in the case of technical cadres 
(CCI-Mercosur 2012). Mercosur relies today on the joint management of voluntary regional normaliza-
tion and standardization through the Mercosur Association of Normalization (AMN, Asociación Mercosur 
de Normalización), a private non-profit and non-governmental organization. Recognized by the Common 
Market Group (CMG),24 AMN consists of the four national institutions of standardization and certification.25 
In 1999, the CMG signed a cooperative agreement with this association, which replaced the old Mercosur 
Committee of Normalization (CMN, Comité Mercosur de Normalización).26 AMN is the only organization 
21 Interview with IRAM executive, Buenos Aires, 23 November 2007.
22 See http://www.iadb.org/en/projects/project-description-title,1303.html?id=RG-T1282, last accessed 25 March 
2013.
23 Interview with IRAM executive, Buenos Aires, 23 November 2007.
24 The CMG is the executive branch of Mercosur, made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Economy, and 
Central Banks’ presidents, plus permanent coordinators from each member country.
25 For further details on AMN structure and objectives, see http://www.amn.org.br/, last accessed 29 March 2013.
26 In 1991, IRAM together with the normalization organizations in Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay led the creation of 
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responsible for the development of technical norms within Mercosur. Though only voluntary, technical 
norms constitute an important instrument in international trade and particularly in regional integration. 
When developing Mercosur Norms (MN), the AMN gives priority to international norms over regional 
norms and those established within Mercosur member countries. In all, when drafting new regional 
regulations, AMN preferences are for international norms, namely those promoted by the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electro Technical Commission (IEC) and the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). From a regional perspective, norms elaborated by the Pan 
American Standards Commission (COPANT) also precede EU norms, as in the cases of CENELEC or CEN.
While demanding active and innovative participation from the private sector, the MEBF also stresses the 
importance of international standards supporting trade facilitation – namely, WCO – and highlights the 
continuation and enhancement of cooperation projects, including training programs and technical assis-
tance plans, between the EU and Mercosur (MEBF 2001). Similarly, Mercosur negotiators emphasize “the 
importance of capacity building on customs cooperation” when dealing with the trade agenda (BNC 2012: 
6).
Finally, during the inter-regional process, the EU’s position has focused on its minimal requirements, 
namely, the completion of Mercosur’s regional integration before discussing free trade (Maur 2005: 1569). 
When negotiating with developing countries, the EU tends to offer access to its own standards and proce-
dures to simplify customs procedures while provisions related to trade facilitation are limited to customs 
cooperation. However, later agreements such as those with Chile and Mexico go even further and include 
the creation of a Special Committee on Customs Cooperation (Fasan 2004; Maur 2005). On the contrary, 
the EU-Mercosur process has promoted the elaboration of Mercosur norms based on international stan-
dards, and although it is part of the negotiation agreement, the implementation of such a committee is still 
pending.27
4.2.2  Education
Interregional cooperation in the area of education is channeled through the Ministers of Education in 
Mercosur. Considered as a fundamental factor, all four-member countries signed an integration protocol 
as early as 1991 to create the Meeting of Mercosur Education Ministers (RME, Reunión de Ministros de 
Educación del Mercosur), which would propose to the Common Market Council (CMC) measures aimed at 
coordinating the educational policies of the member states.28
the CMN. Paraguay is the only case where this institution has a governmental character.
27 This confirms the idea that the EU does not adopt the same policy approach for all regional groupings and individ-
ual countries (Farrell 2009).
28 In 1995, the RME was incorporated into Mercosur’s institutional structure, though the Ministers of Education were 
not granted veto power over the bloc’s formal decisions (Botto/Peixoto Batista 2008).
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Set up as an intergovernmental body, the RME “holds the decisive say in all matters concerning edu-
cation” (Gomes et al. 2012: 228). Its main objective is to promote training in human resources and to 
enhance the development and harmonization of educational systems, all of which are expected to im-
prove students’ and professionals’ mobility and citizens’ awareness of the integration process (Verger/
Hermo 2010). Thus, the agenda of the RME revolves around three main areas: basic, technological and 
higher education. Additionally, this specialized meeting established a regional space called the Educational 
Sector of Mercosur (SEM, Sector Educativo del Mercosur) to encourage cooperation between member 
countries and with other regional blocs, strengthen relations between the SEM and other decision-making 
bodies, and develop a regional identity through mutual understanding as well as a culture of integration. 
Nevertheless, cooperation in the area of higher education is not only about regional identity, but also 
about promoting regional and global competitiveness (Phillips 2001) and engaging in a knowledge-based 
economy (Fulquet 2005; Gomes et al. 2012). Within the SEM, the area of higher education has advanced 
most, especially in terms of three thematic blocs: mobility, accreditation and legibility of degrees, and 
institutional cooperation.29
The preferences of the RME lie in the promotion of cooperation among member countries to promote the 
harmonization of educational systems and build regional compatibilities (Gomes et al. 2012) as well as 
competitiveness. In fact, the Plan for Mercosur’s Educational Sector, established in 2006-2010, validated 
in 2011-2015, and which the EU is currently supporting through the RSP 2007-2013 clearly states that this 
sector 
“constitutes an instance of political coordination to integrate education to the necessary social, eco-
nomic and political processes for the development of the people and national societies. It designs and 
executes policies to promote an education of quality for all, contributing thus to Mercosur’s objectives” 
(Mercosur 2005: 9). 
Interregional cooperation with the EU is intended to enhance this regional strategy. Interestingly, EU co-
operation with Mercosur has lately become more focused on mobility through a project called “Higher 
Education Mobility Support Program.” Given the limited impact of the Mercosur Regional Academic 
Mobility of Accredited Careers (MARCA, Programa de Movilidad Académica Regional) and the limited fi-
nancial resources,30 EU’s cooperation in this particular policy field can be read as an attempt to base its 
strategies on Mercosur’s particular objectives and needs. EU cooperation can certainly provide financial, 
informational and organizational resources through its own intra-regional experience in the area of higher 
education – namely, the Erasmus Mundus and the Bologna Process.
Whereas cooperation is the objective guiding RME strategy, the trade liberalization agenda, which is led by 
the four Foreign Trade Ministries within the Mercosur technical committee on trade in services, relies on 
the idea that education is a commodity that can be provided by the market (Botto/Peixoto Batista 2008). 
29 Bolivia and Chile are fully-fledged members of the SEM.
30 In 2004, the CMC established the Educative Sector Financing Fund to finance education policies and programs 
for regional integration (Mercosur 2004). Member states’ annual contribution is US$ 30,000, plus US$ 2200 per 
million inhabitants aged between five and 24 years old (Mercosur 2008).
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Though based on a different understanding of education – public vs. market good – trade liberalization in 
this area also involves the harmonization of standards, certificates and accreditation.
From the perspective of the EU, cooperation with Mercosur is certainly part of its “more explicit ‘extra-re-
gional’ globalizing strategy” in the area of higher education since the EC acknowledged the declining ex-
pansion of the services sector in Europe (Robertson 2010: 29). Starting in 2003 and with an increased 
impetus in 2008, higher education has been part of the EU’s drive to advance its economic position and 
influence in the world. To this end, several strategies were deployed, namely the Erasmus Mundus program, 
the GATS negotiations, together with EU external relations directed towards the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, industrialized nations (OECD/G8) and developing countries as well (EC 2006). Furthermore, the 
Bologna Follow up Group has elaborated a common strategy for developing the external dimension of the 
European Higher Education Area (Zgaga 2006). This strategy clearly prioritized identifying partner regions – 
rather than countries – and intensifying the exchange of ideas and experiences, as in the case of Mercosur. 
All of this was expected to create the conditions for international mobility, recognition, cooperation and 
attractiveness (Robertson 2010).
When looking into the role of non-state actors, their involvement has been more strongly focused on coop-
eration than on trade liberalization. In fact, civil society has remained rather detached from the negotiation 
of services liberalization, and education has not been an exception to this rule. Contrarily, non-state actors 
are promoting the cooperation agenda on education both at the Mercosur level and within negotiations 
with the EU.
At the interregional level, the EU cooperative agenda in education provides room for collaborative strate-
gies among institutions, agreements between the ministries of education, and the creation and strength-
ening of networks, as in the case of the Ibero-American Summit of Rectors of Public Universities. The active 
role of civil society actors at the interregional level runs parallel to their involvement at the Mercosur level.
Even if the SEM does not envisage any institutional mechanism for the participation of civil society, this 
became apparent in 2006, when the First Mercosur Educational Forum (FEM, Foro Educativo del Mercosur) 
was organized, building on the initiative of CSOs under the “Mesa de Organizaciones Solidarias con la 
Educación.”31 Social and trade union organizations, NGOs, and social movements working in the area of 
education have thus become increasingly involved in these forums that aim to promote dialogue between 
state and civil society in the identification and elaboration of regional challenges (Verger/Hermo 2010). 
In 2003, the Mercosur Educational Platform (PEM, Plataforma Educativa del Mercosur) brought together 
fourteen social and educational organizations in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay to 
promote access, equity and educational standards. Another place for non-state actors is the Montevideo 
Group University Association (AUGM, Asociación de Universidades Grupo Montevideo). Created in 
1991, this network brings together public and autonomous universities in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Paraguay and Uruguay to promote regional integration through scientific, technological, cultural and edu-
cational cooperation among members.
31 So far, four Mercosur Educational Forums have taken place. For further details, see Espósito (2010).
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These emerging networks comprise a wide spectrum of actors, ranging from professors and universities 
to CSOs. Organizations range from the more focused Ação Educativa, Instituto Paulo Freire and Fundación 
SES in Brazil and Argentina, respectively, to Asociación Conciencia and Poder Ciudadano in Argentina and 
Associação Brasileira de Organizações não Governamentais (ABONG) in Brazil. The particular programs pro-
moted by the EU – the teacher mobility program and the project to support mobility in higher education 
– have in turn contributed not only to the construction of a Mercosur citizenship through greater mobility, 
but also to closer and more heterogeneous networks.
In all, cooperation in education has activated a wide array of non-state actors, on the one hand, and estab-
lished close links between state and non-state actors on the other. This turns out to be especially evident in 
the project “Higher Education Mobility Support Program,” which promoted relations between universities 
and students from the four member countries, leading to the establishment of various educational consor-
tiums (CCI-Mercosur 2012).
Their close relationship relies on the convergence of their preferences. As in the case of the RME, the role 
of civil society actors is marked by their strong support of the notion of education as a public good to be 
provided by the state at all levels, including higher education. Their agendas hence focus on cooperation 
to promote “equity and educational quality within Mercosur.”32 This is also the stance of regional aca-
demic institutions, namely the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO) and the Observatorio 
Latinoamericano de Políticas Educativas (OLPED). Thus, their preferences are closer to public universities 
under the AUGM, which also build their strategy on cooperation as they attempt “building a common and 
extended common space.”33 On the contrary, private universities deem education as a market good, and 
have thus a special interest in the trade agenda. However, their interests go well beyond the Mercosur 
market and embrace other South American countries as well (Botto/Peixoto Batista 2008).
5.  Varying Patterns of Regional Governance
After looking into the norms promoted and the capacity building mechanisms envisaged within the trade 
and cooperative agendas in trade facilitation and education, and the strategic constellations within each 
policy, we now turn to comparative assessment, as summarized in Table 4.
32 This is the principle guiding the Plataforma Educativa del Mercosur. For further details, see http://www.gloobal.
net/iepala/gloobal/fichas/ficha.php?id=30595&entidad=Agentes&html=1, last accessed 30 September 2013.
33 Available at http://www.grupomontevideo.edu.uy/index.php/institucional/iquienes-somos, last accessed 30 
September 2013.
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Table 4. Trade facilitation and education: A comparative assessment
Source: Own construction.
Trade facilitation and education are part of the cooperative and trade agendas negotiated at the interre-
gional level. However, when looking across the negotiation process, they show different combinations of 
norms and capacity building mechanisms. The institutional frameworks thus devised have led to particular 
strategic constellations, giving rise in turn to different regulatory governance regimes. 
Regarding trade facilitation, both the 2002-2006 and 2007-2013 RIP introduce this issue as a fundamental 
pillar in the process towards an association agreement. However, later on, as the issue is not mentioned 
in the Mid-Term Review for 2011-2013, trade facilitation remains almost exclusively on the agenda of the 
main negotiation body, the BNC. Despite the limited public information available through the records of 
BNC meetings in terms of the implementation of the Madrid Action Plan, which builds on the Buenos 
Aires Statement on Business Facilitation and later agreements, the issue seems to have lost its cooperative 
dimension, except for a project on environmental norms (ECONORMAS-Mercosur). It is now restricted to 
the main pillar of the interregional agreement: trade liberalization. On the contrary, though included in 
both the trade and cooperative agendas, the initiatives in the area of education show different objectives 
and barely interact. Furthermore, at the interregional level, progress in education was more marked within 
cooperation with Mercosur, as shown by the more precise terms of the different EU strategies.
In respect of the content of the agendas, namely the nature of the rules and norms promoted (which can 
be regional or international), a difference emerges. Both the cooperative and trade agendas were led by a 
general agreement on the establishment of an international norm for promoting trade among Mercosur 
countries and between those and the EU. Whereas the first RSP refers to the need to promote Mercosur 
regulatory institutions, later emphasis is placed on the implementation of international standards and 
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business and normalization institutions under the AMN. Whereas the promotion of international norms 
is one of the objectives of the Buenos Aires Action Plan, the AMN establishes that when elaborating MN, 
international rules should be prioritized over domestic-regional ones, as in the case of the Ibero-American 
norm COPANT, and extra-regional ones such as those coming from European institutions, namely CENELEC 
and CEN.
Within the field of education, the main norm promoted has been domestic-regional. EU’s cooperative 
strategies in education, aimed at promoting the exchange of expertise, technical knowledge and good 
practice between the blocs, are based on Mercosur’s embryonic regional space. As a whole, Mercosur 
has developed intense coordination in the area of education since 1991. Starting with the integration 
protocol signed by the Ministers of Education of the four member countries in 1991, education has been 
increasingly framed as a regional regulatory regime. It is thus one of the longest-standing attempts at 
framing policies at the regional level and one of the prime efforts at promoting common regional norms 
and standards in non-economic issues.
Despite significant differences in terms of the financial resources available for trade facilitation and educa-
tion, the capacity building mechanisms envisaged to promote both issues also employ informational and 
organizational tools. However, the number and types of actors addressed by these are the main difference. 
Whereas in the case of trade facilitation, the mechanisms are directed at business actors and to a lesser 
extent, to normalization institutes, in the case of education, they have allowed for the participation of 
state and non-state actors. Those involved include state actors – namely, the four ministries of education 
– together with a wider set of non-state actors ranging from universities to CSOs working on education 
issues and those dealing with broader topics. Hence, when assessing the actors, the narrative shows that 
the institutional setting of the agendas for trade facilitation and education has led to the involvement of 
different actors, whose roles and networks vary, too.
Within the institutional setting provided by the negotiation of trade facilitation – within both the BNC 
and the cooperative agenda – business actors seem to be playing a more central role. The negotiation of 
regulatory commitments in this area entails discussing norms and standards. All of this demands close 
cooperation between state actors and non-state ones with the required expertise, which state actors in 
developing countries usually lack (Bianculli 2010). Government actors increasingly rely on non-state actors, 
as shown by the creation of AMN. While technical non-state bodies have gained more influence in the 
formation of Mercosur’s regulatory regime, there is still no comprehensive record of measures undertaken 
by the private sector under the MEBF. Certainly, this actor had a sound impact on interregional negotiation 
through several initiatives concerning trade facilitation. However, MEBF’s influence on recent develop-
ments remains obscure. In all, the institutional setting of trade facilitation has established a dyadic regional 
constellation, marked by close ties between state and business actors based on the interchange of techni-
cal information and expertise. Even if in a lax manner, the interregional negotiation process has promoted 
closer cooperation with other institutions on both sides of the Atlantic. 
As business actors attempted to elaborate a common stance based on sound technical information, the 
MEBF has forced business actors to agree in order to strengthen their position when negotiating with 
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public officials and trade negotiators.34 Furthermore, business actors managed to create a network through 
their liaison with Sciences Po, the IDB and European standardization institutions. Given the difficulties in 
achieving consensus at the governmental level, where the trade facilitation agenda lies, the private sector 
attempts to promote private agreements. The final objective is no longer to advance regulatory harmo-
nization but rather to promote informational exchange about norms and standards the different parties 
support. This accounts for the interchanges with regulatory institutions in the EU and other international 
financial institutions, as in the case of the IDB.
In the case of education, the institutional setting provided by the negotiation between the EU and Mercosur 
has promoted a multi-regional constellation, bringing together state actors in the RME with universities, 
social and political organizations, specialized NGOs, and various stakeholders at domestic and regional 
levels. Being closely related to the provision of public services, education is based on complex ideas, es-
pecially when compared with traditional trade policy or even commercial policy (Young 2007: 796). The 
implications of trade liberalization and regulatory commitments in this area are expected to spur a wider 
range of state and non-state actors. Still, our analysis shows that the institutional setting provided by the 
agenda for education has addressed larger and more heterogeneous constituencies. Combined with the 
promotion of Mercosur’s own domestic-regional norms, it has allowed networks to include a wider array 
of state and non-state actors, including non-trade ministries, in all four-member countries. Furthermore, 
in terms of the cooperative requirements, capacity building mechanisms in the area of education have 
extended Mercosur’s regional networks across the domestic and regional levels. As for the establishment 
of dialogue and interchange mechanisms with potential partner institutions and organizations in the EU, 
Mercosur actors seem to have chosen other places for closer interregional relations. These places include 
the programs the EU has directed towards Latin America, of which Mercosur member countries are among 
the chief beneficiaries, namely, Alban, Al-Invest, Urb-Al Alure and ALFA.
6.  Some Final Remarks
This article has looked into the negotiation agenda of two different sectors – trade facilitation and edu-
cation – within the wider interregional relationship of the EU and Mercosur. The findings reveal how and 
to what extent the institutional setting provided by negotiations about regulatory commitments in these 
areas has built a particular context for a regulatory governance regime.
With trade facilitation, the emerging form of regulatory governance is based on international rules and 
standards in order to help establish Mercosur’s own norms for enabling trade among its constituent coun-
tries, and with the EU. The capacity building mechanisms have mainly concerned the business sector un-
der the MEBF. The technical requirements for negotiation have obliged this actor to form closer ties with 
other associations at the domestic, regional and interregional levels, and with academics and development 
34 Despite existing differences, MEBF has managed to speak with one voice on behalf of European and Mercosur 
business interests. Only once has the business group failed to produce a complete joint document and this was 
with respect to agriculture (Bianculli 2010).
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banks. Whereas interregional negotiations have clearly involved the participation of different levels of pub-
lic officials and negotiators, when it comes to non-state actors, the process has established a single channel 
to allow communication with the private sector at domestic, regional and interregional levels. In sum, the 
trade facilitation agenda has provided an institutional setting for a dyadic international regulatory regime, 
marked by the promotion of international standards and the closer links with business actors.
The regulatory governance regime triggered by the interregional process in education is characterized by 
the promotion of regional standards and norms, these being mainly domestic-regional norms set by the 
RME and SEM in the early 1990s. The main involved actors are the four ministries of education at regional 
– through the RME – and domestic levels, together with a wide array of non-state actors. The latter include 
universities, teachers and students as direct beneficiaries, together with diverse CSOs. The interregional 
negotiation process has thus been based on the Mercosur regional frame. Combined with the provision of 
capacity building mechanisms addressing a more heterogeneous set of non-state actors, this has resulted 
in a multiplex regional regulatory regime.
These findings provide three main insights. First, they reveal the changing patterns of regulatory gover-
nance as integration advances through the harmonizing of standards and norms in areas beyond trade 
in the Global South. Second, the study has shown the increasing presence and relevance of networks 
mobilizing particular constellations of multiple state and non-state actors, simultaneously operating at dif-
ferent levels – domestic, regional and interregional – and their considerable variation across economic and 
social realms. Finally, the paper highlights the significance of capacity building mechanisms as incentives 
for regional actors to implement, adopt and even strengthen regional regulatory changes. Furthermore, 
negotiations between the EU and Mercosur reveal that these may become even more relevant when trade 
liberalization either comes to a halt or shows little progress because of conflicting interests. Still, it is clear 
that the ways in which North-South trade negotiations can promote particular regulatory governance re-
gimes do not take place in a vacuum. In this, the EU’s influence depends on the extent to which its capacity 
building mechanisms are consistent with regional processes. 
Several elements have hindered the EU’s promotion of stronger regulatory governance in the area of trade 
facilitation, namely governmental discrepancies and competition about norms, showing that the EU is not 
the only game in town. On the contrary, the EU-Mercosur process has accompanied an existing process 
of regulatory governance through the RME and the SEM. Thus, the EU has strengthened this embryonic 
regulatory governance regime in education. With funding, and through the interchange of expertise, expe-
rience and technical knowledge, the EU has provided Southern governments with valuable resources. In all, 
we can expect this cooperation to have an impact on the regulatory capabilities of Southern states and the 
consolidation of the regional arena as a new regulatory space.
The paper also illustrates a broader point: the need to deepen our understanding of the ways in which 
regulatory governance advances in the Global South. Whereas the focus has been on trade negotiations 
between industrialized and developing countries, future research should look into the impact of the in-
creasing integration among countries and regional blocs in the developing world. This is a question of 
importance not only for Latin America, but also for the remainder of the Global South.
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The Kolleg-Forschergruppe - Encouraging Academic Exchange and 
Intensive Research
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) is a new funding programme laun-
ched by the German Research Foundation in 2008. It is a centrepie-
ce of the KFG to provide a scientifically stimulating environment in 
which innovative research topics can be dealt with by discourse and 
debate within a small group of senior and junior researchers. 
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe „The Transformative Power of Europe“ 
brings together research on European affairs in the Berlin-Branden-
burg region and institutionalizes the cooperation with other univer-
sities and research institutions. It examines the role of the EU as pro-
moter and recipient of ideas, analyzing the mechanisms and effects 
of internal and external diffusion processes in three research areas:
• Identity and the Public Sphere
• Compliance, Conditionality and Beyond
• Comparative Regionalism and Europe’s External Relations
